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Antonella Pellicani

13 September 2024
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2980
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Abstract
By applying a structural demand model to unique consumer-level survey data from the euro area, we assess how different CBDC design options, combined with individual (revealed) preferences, influence the potential demand for a digital euro. Estimating the demand for a digital euro, we find that if it were unconstrained, it could range, in steady state, between 3-28% of household liquid assets or €0.12 - €1.11 trillion, depending on whether consumers would perceive the digital euro to be more cash-like or deposit-like. With an illustrative €3,000 holding limit per person, it could instead range between 2-9% or €0.10 -€0.38 trillion. Privacy, automatic funding, and instant settlement raise its potential demand.
JEL Code
E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
18 April 2024
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 346
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Abstract
A digital euro would provide the general public with an additional means of payment in the form of risk-free central bank money in digital form that is universally accepted for digital payments across the euro area. A digital euro would offer a wide range of financial stability benefits, including safeguarding the role of public money and strengthening the strategic autonomy and monetary sovereignty of the euro area in the digital era. It would be designed to have no material impact on financial stability or the transmission of monetary policy. This paper shows the usefulness of digital euro safeguards, such as holding limits, that would limit the impact of the introduction of a digital euro on banks’ liquidity and on their reliance on central bank funding. To this end, it assesses how banks might respond to the introduction of a digital euro while seeking to maximise profitability and manage their risks for a range of holding limit scenarios. The results of the simulated impact on key liquidity metrics show that, with safeguards in place and on aggregate, the liquidity metrics of euro area banks would decline but remain well above regulatory minimums. In addition, the central bank funding ratios of euro area banks would not increase materially on aggregate and would remain contained overall.
JEL Code
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
22 November 2023
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOX
Financial Stability Review Issue 2, 2023
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Abstract
Central banks around the world have stepped up their efforts to explore and develop their own digital currencies (known as CBDCs), an electronic equivalent to cash. In the euro area, the introduction of a CBDC (“digital euro”) could offer several financial stability benefits by providing an alternative to new forms of private digital money and spurring innovation. At the same time, a CBDC, if not properly designed, could prompt financial stability risks and affect the structure and scale of bank intermediation. In the absence of effective safeguards, such as caps on individual holdings, the materialisation of high deposit outflows could heighten liquidity risk for significant institutions. However, the envisaged design of a digital euro would address such financial stability concerns by applying adequate caps on individual holdings.
JEL Code
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
11 July 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 18
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Abstract
This article describes the main features and risks of decentralised finance (DeFi), focusing in particular on similarities and differences between DeFi and traditional finance. While the financial services provided through DeFi mainly replicate those of traditional financial services but within the crypto-asset ecosystem, they are provided in a novel way that relies on automated protocols and cuts out centralised intermediaries. The article explains how this novel method of service provision entails specific financial stability risks and regulatory challenges.
JEL Code
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
11 July 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 18
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Abstract
Stablecoins are in the spotlight due to their rapid growth, increasing global use cases and potential financial risk contagion channels. This article analyses the role played by stablecoins within the wider crypto-asset ecosystem and finds that some existing stablecoins are already critical to liquidity in crypto-asset markets. This could have wide-ranging implications for crypto-asset markets if a large stablecoin were to fail and could also have contagion effects if crypto-assets’ interlinkages with the traditional financial system continue rising. To date, the speed and cost of stablecoin transactions, as well as their redemption terms and conditions, have fallen short of what is required of practical means of payment in the real economy. Their growth, innovation and increasing use cases, coupled with their potential contagion channels to the financial sector, call for the urgent implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and oversight frameworks before significant further interconnectedness with the traditional financial system occurs.
JEL Code
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
G13 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Contingent Pricing, Futures Pricing
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation