Regine Wölfinger
- 24 August 2007
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 70Details
- Abstract
- The present paper does not claim to solve the Columbus' egg conundrum. There even may not be a "silver bullet"
- JEL Code
- E : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
- 1 July 2005
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 32Details
- Abstract
- Financial crises in emerging market economies are often accompanied by difficulties of the sovereign to honour its contractual obligations. The official sector may reduce the likelihood of a disorderly outcome by extending financial assistance but there are limits to official sector involvement, not least because the potential volume of IMF lending is small compared to private capital flows and because a large "bail out" by the official sector would lead to moral hazard. For both these reasons - limited official funds and moral hazard - private sector creditors need to share some of the financial burden and thereby actively get involved in the management of financial crises in emerging market economies. The purpose of this report is to review the instruments that may promote such private creditor involvement as well as to provide a stock-taking of past experience and identify areas of possible improvement to the framework for crisis resolution.
- JEL Code
- F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems