Erwan Quintin
- 28 February 2005
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 442Details
- Abstract
- We describe a dynamic model of financial intermediation in which fundamental characteristics of the economy imply a unique equilibrium path of bank and financial market lending. Yet we also show that economies whose fundamental characteristics have converged may continue to have very different financial structures. Because setting up financial markets is costly in our model, economies that emphasize financial market lending are more likely to continue doing so in the future, all else equal.
- JEL Code
- L16 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change, Industrial Price Indices
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
N20 : Economic History→Financial Markets and Institutions→General, International, or Comparative
- 1 February 2002
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 126Details
- Abstract
- This paper describes optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model with stochastic monitoring. An agent operates a risky project on behalf of a principal over several periods. Each period, the principal can observe the revenues from the project provided he incurs a fixed cost. We show that an optimal contract exists with the property that, in each period and for every possible revenue announcement by the agent, either the principal claims he entire proceeds from the project or promises to claim nothing in the future. This structure of payments enables the principal to minimize audit costs over the duration of the project. Those optimal contracts are such that the agent's expected income rises with time. Moreover, except in at most one period, the principal claims the entire returns of the project whenever audit occurs. We also provide conditions under which all optimal contracts must satisfy hese properties
- JEL Code
- D8 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
C7 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Game Theory and Bargaining Theory