Nie je k dispozícii v slovenčine.
Gabriel Glöckler
Communications
- Current Position
-
Principal Adviser
- Fields of interest
-
Public Economics,Other Special Topics
- Other current responsibilities
- 2020-
Member of the Executive Committee of the Research and Policy Network on central bank communications of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
- 2013-
Visiting Professor, College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium
- Education
- 1996-1997
M.A. European Studies, College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium
- 1993-1996
M.A. (Oxon) Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, St Edmund Hall, University of Oxford, United Kingdom
- Professional experience
- 2016-
Senior Manager (Principal Adviser), Directorate General Communications, European Central Bank
- 2013-2016
Head of Division, Directorate General Secretariat, European Central Bank, Assistant Secretary to the ECB's Executive Board and Governing Council
- 2009-2013
Deputy Head of Division, EU Institutions Division, Directorate General International and European Relations, European Central Bank
- 2011-2013
Member of the Economic Policy Committee of the EU
- 2003-2009
Counsellor to the Vice-President, Counsel to the Executive Board, European Central Bank
- 1999-2003
(Senior) Economist, European Relations Division, Directorate General International and European Relations, European Central Bank
- 1997-1998
Academic Assistant, College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium
- Teaching experience
- 2013-
EMU and Euro Area Governance, Department of European Political and Governance Studies, College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium
- 2017
Oxford University Business Economics Programme
- 2003
University of of Applied Sciences of Deutsche Bundesbank
- 13 October 2022
- THE ECB BLOGRelated
- 24 August 2022
- THE ECB BLOG
- 12 January 2022
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - ARTICLEEconomic Bulletin Issue 8, 2021Details
- Abstract
- How central banks communicate matters. Communication has become a key instrument to make policy more effective and improve central banks’ transparency and accountability, ultimately helping to build trust among the wider public whom they serve. As part of its recent strategy review, the ECB analysed how its communication, in particular with the wider public, can be improved. This article further complements the findings of the strategy review. The article aims to provide a better understanding of the ECB’s audiences among the wider public, what matters to them, and what happens between the sending and the receiving end of ECB communication. The findings point to possible avenues to make the ECB’s monetary policy communication more effective.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 21 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 274Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines the importance of central bank communication in ensuring the effectiveness of monetary policy and in underpinning the credibility, accountability and legitimacy of independent central banks. It documents how communication has become a monetary policy tool in itself; one example of this being forward guidance, given its impact on inflation expectations, economic behaviour and inflation. The paper explains why and how consistent, clear and effective communication to expert and non-expert audiences is essential in an environment of an ever-increasing need by central banks to reach these audiences. Central banks must also meet the demand for more understandable information about policies and tools, while at the same time overcoming the challenge posed by the wider public’s rational inattention. Since the European Central Bank was established, the communications landscape has changed dramatically and continues to evolve. This paper outlines how better communication, including greater engagement with the wider public, could help boost people’s understanding of and trust in the Eurosystem.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 4 July 2013
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 150Details
- Abstract
- Taking a cue from the assertion that "loose lips sink markets" (Carmassi and Micossi, 2010), this paper investigates to what extent and why political communication has had an impact on the sovereign bond spreads of selected euro area countries over the German Bund. Drawing on 25,000 news media releases between January 2009 and October 2011, it empirically compares political communication across various political actors at the supranational and national levels in the euro area. It finds empirical evidence that, in the short term, certain types of political communication have a quantifiable effect on sovereign bond spreads. This effect can be positive or negative depending on the type of communication, possibly fuelling self-reinforcing feedback loops between markets and policy actions. Subsequently, this paper explores possible reasons for this observed phenomenon. It analyses the specific economic, political and institutional context in which political communication works in Europe and finds that the potential for miscommunication is structurally higher in the euro area than in other nation-based currency areas. Finally, the paper identifies avenues to make communication policy more effective and puts forward possible measures to mitigate the risks of miscommunication.
- JEL Code
- C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
D70 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→General
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
F50 : International Economics→International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy→General
- 22 September 2011
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 127Details
- Abstract
- This Occasional Paper examines how and why the institutional framework governing EMU has evolved since the creation of the euro. Building on theories of institutionalism, the paper in particular investigates to what extent functional spillovers from the single currency into other policy domains, like macroeconomic policies or financial regulation, met with an adequate institutional response, and to what extent the existing institutional framework conditioned the response to the financial crisis. The interaction between policy requirements and institutional capabilities is examined both in
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
D84 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Expectations, Speculations
- 2024
- Conclusions and Plenary Debates. The XXX FIDE Congress in Sofia 2023 Congress Publications, Volume IV
- 2024
- Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2024Währungspolitik
- 2023
- European Commission “Clear Writing for Europe” conference 22 May 2023
- 2023
- The EU Political System After the 2019 European Elections
- 2023
- Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2023Währungspolitik
- 2022
- "Geldcast" Podcast swissinfo.ch
- 2022
- Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2022Währungspolitik
- 2022
- The ECB Podcast episode 33
- 2022
- The ECB Podcast episode 38
- 2021
- The ECB Podcast episode 19
- 2021
- Finanzfluss
- 2021
- SSRN
- 2021
- Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2021Währungspolitik
- 2020
- Handbuch Europäische Union
- 2020
- Jahrbuch derEuropäischen IntegrationWährungspolitik
- 2019
- Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2019Währungspolitik
- 2019
- paper presented at the 16th Biennial Conference of the EU Studies Association, Denver, 2019Beyond expert circles: Measuring central banks’ engagement with the wider public
- 2018
- Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2018Währungspolitik
- 2017
- Graduation speech for the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
- 2016
- Bologna Institute for Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University
- 2016
- Journal of European Public Policy
- 2015
- paper presented at the conference "The ECB in the Institutional, Political, and Economic Framework of the Post-crisis EU""Engage, explain and convince" - Recent trends in communication and transparency of the European Central Bank
- 2015
- Europäisches UnionsrechtDie Wirtschafts- und Währungspolitik - Vorbemerkungen zu den Artikeln 119-144 AUEV
- 2013
- Journal of European Integration
- 2012
- University of Edinburgh
- 2012
- TEDx event "Everything Communicates" Frankfurt am Main
- 2012
- Journal of European Public Policy
- 2011
- The EU in International Fora – Lessons for the Union’s External Representation after LisbonFrom polyphony to harmony? The external representation of EMU
- 2011
- Griechenland und die Lehren für die Euro-ZoneWege aus der Krise – die Zukunft der Eurozone
- 2009
- After the Crisis: A new socio-economic settlement for the EU
- 2007
- Management Reforms in International OrganizationsFrom Take-off to Cruising Altitude: Management Reform and Organizational Change of the European Central Bank
- 2005
- Governance and Legitimacy in EMUWhy ‘more’ is not always ‘better’: information availability and central bank transparency
- 2005
- Institutionalization of international negotiation systemsReflections on decision-making in the Governing Council of the ECB – the case of the adjustment of voting modalities in the Governing Council
- 2002
- The Polish Way to the Euro
- 2001
- Problèmes d'Amérique latine, No. 41
- 1998
- Blackstone Press Limited, LondonGuide to EU Policies
- 1998
- Current Politics and Economics of EuropeA ‘Single Voice’ for Europe’s Single Currency?
- 1998
- EU FocusECB External Policy - Evolution or Revolution?
- 1998
- Manchester University Working Paper No. 2/98The euro and the politics of international monetary relations