Nie je k dispozícii v slovenčine.
Gianluca Santilli
- 26 July 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2959Details
- Abstract
- In the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis, the question of who should bear the burden of banking crises has been a cornerstone of the new supervisory framework in Europe. We evaluate the bail-in regulation (BRRD) for bank bond holdings using a proprietary database covering holdings of all euro-denominated securities. We focus on hard-to-value bailinable bank bonds and show that banks increased their holdings of bailinable bank bonds while households and non-financial corporations reduced their holdings of bailinable bonds issued by riskier banks.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation