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Marie Hoerova

Research

Current Position

Senior Adviser

Fields of interest

Financial Economics,Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics

Email

marie.hoerova@ecb.europa.eu

Other current responsibilities
2015-

CEPR Research Fellow, Financial Economics Programme

2015-

Editorial Board Member, ECB Working Paper Series

2013-

Associate Editor, Journal of Financial Intermediation

Education
2001-2006

PhD in Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, United States

1997-2000

BA in Economics, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

Professional experience
2021-

Senior Adviser - Directorate General Research, European Central Bank

2019-2021

Adviser - Monetary Policy Research Division, Directorate General Research, European Central Bank

2017-2019

Principal Economist - Financial Research Division, Directorate General Research, European Central Bank

2015-2017

Senior Economist - Financial Research Division, Directorate General Research, European Central Bank

2006-2014

Economist - Financial Research Division, Directorate General Research, European Central Bank

Awards
2021

Kateřina Šmídková Prize - Czech Economic Society

2017

Best paper prize of the Europlace Institute of Finance (for "Risk-sharing or risk-taking? Counterparty risk, incentives and margins")

2016

Best paper award of the Journal of Financial Intermediation (for "Lending-of-last-resort is as lending-of-last-resort does: Central bank liquidity provision and interbank market functioning in the euro area")

2013

Visiting scholar, Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, United States

2009

Marjolin prize of the European Money & Finance Forum (for "Liquidity hoarding and interbank market spreads")

2009

Best paper prize of the Bocconi University conference "Business Models in Banking" (for "Liquidity hoarding and interbank market spreads")

2003

Outstanding teaching award, Louis Walinsky Fund in Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, United States

2001

Fulbright fellowship to study in the United States (2001-2006)

2000

Socrates fellowship to study at the Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

Teaching experience
2011-2014

Financial Intermediation Theory (graduate level) - Instructor, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

2005

International Economics (graduate level) - Teaching assistant, Cornell University, Ithaca, United States

2003

Econometrics (undergraduate level) - Teaching assistant, Cornell University, Ithaca, United States

2002

Probability and Statistics (undergraduate level) - Teaching assistant, Cornell University, Ithaca, United States

27 November 2023
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2879
Details
Abstract
We study how monetary policy and risk shocks affect asset prices in the US, the euro area, and Japan, differentiating between “traditional” monetary policy and communication events, each decomposed into “pure” and information shocks. Communication shocks from the US spill over to risk in the euro area and vice versa, but traditional US shocks show no spillover effects to risk. Both monetary policy and communication shocks spill over to stocks, with euro area information spillovers being particularly strong. US spillovers are consistent with global CAPM intuition whereas euro area spillovers are larger. Importantly, we document a strong global component of risk shocks which is not driven by monetary policy.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
14 November 2023
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2874
Details
Abstract
Using security-by-security data on investor holdings in the euro area, we study run dynamics across different fund-shares of the same fund during the unprecedented liquidity crisis in March 2020. For an average bond or equity mutual fund-share, households, other euro area funds, and the foreign sector each represent about a quarter of the total holdings. Insurance companies hold another 14%, with all other investors combined (banks, non-financial corporations, pension funds, etc.) accounting for less than 10% of holdings. Analyzing bond funds, we show that fund-shares with higher ownership by other funds suffered substantially higher outflows (by 6 percentage points), while fund-shares with higher ownership by households had substantially lower outflows (by 5 percentage points) compared to the other fund-shares within the same fund. This gap is not driven by time-varying differences in fund performance. Results for equity funds are similar, although they faced substantially smaller outflows, coupled with much larger declines in performance, compared to bond funds. Our findings suggest that a collective “dash for cash” by consumers and firms in need of liquidity at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic was not the source of mutual fund fragility. Instead, the most run-prone investor type turned out to be the fund sector itself.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
22 June 2023
RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 108
Details
Abstract
Are central bank tools effective in reaching non-banks with no access to the lender of last resort facilities? Using runs on mutual funds in March 2020 as a laboratory, we show that, following the announcement of large-scale asset purchases, funds with higher ex ante shares of assets eligible for central bank purchases saw their performance improve by 3.6 percentage points and outflows decrease by 61% relative to otherwise similar funds. Following central bank liquidity provision to banks, the growth rate of repo lending to funds by banks more exposed to the system-wide liquidity crisis was up to five times higher compared with other banks.
JEL Code
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
13 April 2023
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2805
Details
Abstract
Are central bank tools effective in reaching non-banks with no access to the lender-of-last-resort facilities? Using runs on mutual funds in March 2020 as a laboratory, we show that, following the announcement of large-scale purchases, funds with higher ex ante shares of assets eligible for central bank purchases saw their performance improve by 3.6 percentage points and outflows decrease by 61% relative to otherwise similar funds. Following central bank liquidity provision to banks, the growth rate of repo lending to funds by banks more exposed to the system-wide liquidity crisis was up to five times higher compared to other banks.
JEL Code
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
18 March 2021
RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 82
Details
Abstract
Many central bank measures implemented in past years – most recently the additional longer-term refinancing operations launched by the Eurosystem at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic – aimed inter alia at safeguarding money market conditions. This is because smoothly functioning money markets are key for the transmission of monetary policy to credit conditions in the economy. In this article we look at money market conditions in the euro area over the past 15 years and discuss the interactions between money markets, central bank policies and new Basel III regulations.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
Network
Research Task Force (RTF)
21 October 2020
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2483
Details
Abstract
This paper analyses money market developments since 2005, and examines factors that have affected money market functioning. We consider several metrics of activity in both secured and unsecured euro area money markets, and study interactions with new Basel III regulations and with central bank policies (liquidity provision, asset purchases and the Securities Lending Programme). Using aggregate data, we document that, prior to 2015, heightened financial market volatility coincided with worsening money market conditions, while higher central bank liquidity provision was associated with reduced money market stress. After 2015, the evidence is consistent with central bank asset purchases inducing scarcity effects in some money market segments, and with active securities lending supporting money market functioning. Using transactions-level money market data combined with supervisory data, we further document that the leverage ratio regulation impacts money markets at quarter-ends due to “window-dressing” effects, reducing money market volumes and rates. We also consider the macroeconomic impact of changing money market conditions, finding that the impact depends on whether frictions originate in secured or unsecured markets and on central bank policies in place.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
Network
Discussion papers
21 October 2020
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES - No. 12
Details
Abstract
This paper analyses money market developments since 2005, and examines factors that have affected money market functioning. We consider several metrics of activity in both secured and unsecured euro area money markets, and study interactions with new Basel III regulations and with central bank policies (liquidity provision, asset purchases and the Securities Lending Programme). Using aggregate data, we document that, prior to 2015, heightened financial market volatility coincided with worsening money market conditions, while higher central bank liquidity provision was associated with reduced money market stress. After 2015, the evidence is consistent with central bank asset purchases inducing scarcity effects in some money market segments, and with active securities lending supporting money market functioning. Using transactions-level money market data combined with supervisory data, we further document that the leverage ratio regulation impacts money markets at quarter-ends due to “window-dressing” effects, reducing money market volumes and rates. We also consider the macroeconomic impact of changing money market conditions, finding that the impact depends on whether frictions originate in secured or unsecured markets and on central bank policies in place.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
30 April 2019
RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 57
Details
Abstract
Money markets are an important source of short-term funding for banks, which rely heavily on them to cover their liquidity needs. But when money markets do not function smoothly, banks may have to de-leverage or increase their holdings of liquid assets, leading to a decline in lending and output. This decline can be mitigated by central banks if they increase the size of their balance sheets.
JEL Code
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
Network
Research Task Force (RTF)
13 February 2019
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2239
Details
Abstract
During the financial and sovereign debt crises, euro area interbank money markets underwent dramatic changes: the share of unsecured borrowing declined throughout the euro area, while private market haircuts on sovereign bonds and bank borrowing from the European Central Bank increased in the South. We construct a quantitative general equilibrium model to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of these developments and the associated policy response. Our model features heterogeneous banks and sovereign bonds, secured and unsecured money markets, and a central bank. We compare a benchmark policy – the central bank providing collateralized lending to banks at haircuts lower than the market - to an alternative policy that maintains a constant central bank balance sheet. We show that the fall in output, investment, and capital would have been twice as high under the alternative policy. More generally, the model allows the analysis of monetary policy tools beyond interest rate policies and quantitative easing.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
30 October 2018
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2191
Details
Abstract
Protection buyers use derivatives to share risk with protection sellers, whose assets are only imperfectly pledgeable because of moral hazard. To mitigate moral hazard, privately optimal derivative contracts involve variation margins. When margins are called, protection sellers must liquidate some of their own assets. We analyse, in a general-equilibrium framework, whether this leads to inefficient fire sales. If investors buying in a fire sale interim can also trade ex ante with protection buyers, equilibrium is information-constrained efficient even though not all marginal rates of substitution are equalized. Otherwise, privately optimal margin calls are inefficiently high. To address this inefficiency, public policy should facilitate ex-ante contracting among all relevant counterparties.
JEL Code
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
D62 : Microeconomics→Welfare Economics→Externalities
G13 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Contingent Pricing, Futures Pricing
D82 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
13 July 2018
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES - No. 5
Details
Abstract
This paper investigates the costs and bene ts of liquidity regulation. We find that liquidity tools are beneficial but cannot completely remove the need for Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) interventions by the central bank. Full compliance with current Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) rules would have reduced banks' reliance on publicly provided liquidity during the global financial crisis without removing such assistance altogether. The paper also investigates the output costs of introducing the LCR and NSFR using two macrofinancial models. We find these costs to be modest.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
13 July 2018
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2169
Details
Abstract
This paper investigates the costs and benefits of liquidity regulation. We find that liquidity tools are beneficial but cannot completely remove the need for Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) interventions by the central bank. Full compliance with current Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) rules would have reduced banks’ reliance on publicly provided liquidity during the global financial crisis without removing such assistance altogether. The paper also investigates the output costs of introducing the LCR and NSFR using two macro-financial models. We find these costs to be modest.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
Network
Discussion papers
7 November 2017
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2107
Details
Abstract
This paper examines the role of collateral in the financial system, with special emphasis on the implications for financial stability and the conduct of monetary policy. First, we review what drives the demand and supply for both real and financial collateral assets. Then we examine financial stability issues and the case for regulating the use of collateral. We discuss the role and design of market infrastructures such as central clearing counterparties (CCPs). Finally, we examine the interaction of standard and non-standard monetary policy and the functioning of private collateralised markets. We show that the use of collateral is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for financial stability. To ensure the stability of collateralised markets a mix of micro- and macro-prudential regulation, as well as a sufficient supply of safe public assets that can be used as collateral, are needed.
JEL Code
E59 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Other
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
Network
Discussion papers
7 November 2017
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES - No. 4
Details
Abstract
This paper examines the role of collateral in the financial system, with special emphasis on the implications for financial stability and the conduct of monetary policy. First, we review what drives the demand and supply for both real and financial collateral assets. Then we examine financial stability issues and the case for regulating the use of collateral. We discuss the role and design of market infrastructures such as central clearing counterparties (CCPs). Finally, we examine the interaction of standard and non-standard monetary policy and the functioning of private collateralised markets. We show that the use of collateral is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for financial stability. To ensure the stability of collateralised markets a mix of micro- and macro-prudential regulation, as well as a sufficient supply of safe public assets that can be used as collateral, are needed.
JEL Code
E59 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Other
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
19 February 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1886
Details
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of ample liquidity provision by the European Central Bank on the functioning of the overnight unsecured interbank market from 2008 to 2014. We use novel data on interbank transactions derived from TARGET2, the main euro area payment system. To identify exogenous shocks to central bank liquidity, we exploit the timing of ECB liquidity operations and use a simple structural vector auto-regression framework. We argue that the ECB acted as a de-facto lender-of-last-resort to the euro area banking system and identify two main effects of central bank liquidity provision on interbank markets. First, central bank liquidity replaces the demand for liquidity in the interbank market, especially during the financial crisis (2008-2010). Second, it increases the supply of liquidity in the interbank market in stressed countries (Greece, Italy and Spain) during the sovereign debt crisis (2011-2013).
JEL Code
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
14 May 2014
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1675
Details
Abstract
We decompose the squared VIX index, derived from US S&P500; options prices, into the conditional variance of stock returns and the equity variance premium. We evaluate a plethora of state-of-the-art volatility forecasting models to produce an accurate measure of the conditional variance. We then examine the predictive power of the VIX and its two components for stock market returns, economic activity and financial instability. The variance premium predicts stock returns while the conditional stock market variance predicts economic activity and has a relatively higher predictive power for financial instability than does the variance premium.
JEL Code
C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
C52 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
17 March 2014
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1658
Details
Abstract
We measure the commonality in hedge fund returns, identify its main driving factor and analyse its implications for financial stability. We find that hedge funds
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
9 July 2013
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1565
Details
Abstract
The VIX, the stock market option-based implied volatility, strongly co-moves with measures of the monetary policy stance. When decomposing the VIX into two components, a proxy for risk aversion and expected stock market volatility (
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
1 October 2012
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1481
Details
Abstract
We study the optimal design of clearing systems. We analyze how counterparty risk should be allocated, whether traders should be fully insured against that risk, and how moral hazard affects the optimal allocation of risk. The main advantage of centralized clearing, as opposed to no or decentralized clearing, is the mutualization of risk. While mutualization fully insures idiosyncratic risk, it cannot provide insurance against aggregate risk. When the latter is significant, it is efficient that protection buyers exert effort to find robust counterparties, whose low default risk makes it possible for the clearing system to withstand aggregate shocks. When this effort is unobservable, incentive compatibility requires that protection buyers retain some exposure to counterparty risk even with centralized clearing.
JEL Code
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
D82 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
10 January 2012
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1413
Details
Abstract
We analyze optimal hedging contracts and show that although hedging aims at sharing risk, it can lead to more risk-taking. News implying that a hedge is likely to be loss-making undermines the risk-prevention incentives of the protection seller. This incentive problem limits the capacity to share risks and generates endogenous counterparty risk. Optimal hedging can therefore lead to contagion from news about insured risks to the balance sheet of insurers. Such endogenous risk is more likely to materialize ex post when the ex ante probability of counterparty default is low. Variation margins emerge as an optimal mechanism to enhance risk-sharing capacity. Paradoxically, they can also induce more risk-taking. Initial margins address the market failure caused by unregulated trading of hedging contracts among protection sellers.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
D82 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
11 December 2009
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1126
Details
Abstract
We study the functioning and possible breakdown of the interbank market in the presence of counterparty risk. We allow banks to have private information about the risk of their assets. We show how banks
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
D82 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
11 November 2009
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1107
Details
Abstract
We study the functioning of secured and unsecured inter-bank markets in the presence of credit risk. The model generates empirical predictions that are in line with developments during the 2007-2009 financial crises. Interest rates decouple across secured and unsecured markets following an adverse shock to credit risk. The scarcity of underlying collateral may amplify the volatility of interest rates in secured markets. We use the model to discuss various policy responses to the crisis.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
30 September 2009
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1091
Details
Abstract
We study credible information transmission by a benevolent Central Bank. We consider two possibilities: direct revelation through an announcement, versus indirect information transmission through monetary policy. These two ways of transmitting information have very different consequences. Since the objectives of the Central Bank and those of individual investors are not always aligned, private investors might rationally ignore announcements by the Central Bank. In contrast, information transmission through changes in the interest rate creates a distortion, thus, lending an amount of credibility. This induces the private investors to rationally take into account information revealed through monetary policy.
JEL Code
D80 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→General
E40 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→General
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
31 March 2009
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1037
Details
Abstract
Implied volatility indices should have information about risk parameters, once they are cleansed of the influence of normal volatility dynamics and macro-economic uncertainty. Building on intuition from the dynamic asset pricing literature, we uncover unobserved risk aversion and fundamental uncertainty from the observed time series of the VIX and the credit spreads while controlling for realized volatility, expectations about the macroeconomic outlook, and interest rates. We apply this methodology to monthly data from both Germany and the US. We find that implied volatilities contain a substantial amount of information regarding risk aversion whereas credit spreads have a lot to say about both risk aversion and uncertainty. Moreover, there is a significant comovement in the German and US risk aversion.
JEL Code
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
20 December 2007
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 845
Details
Abstract
I analyze the role that asset markets play in the performance and stability of the run-prone banking sector. Banks insure consumers against privately observed liquidity shocks. Asset market investments insure consumers against losses from bank runs. If the probability of a run is small, then banks specialize fully into the provision of liquidity insurance: They provide a higher degree of liquidity insurance when compared to the economy with banks alone. If the probability of a run is high, consumers prefer to invest solely through the asset market. Insurance against runs provided by the market investment reduces consumers' incentives to run. Increased provision of liquidity insurance by banks has the opposite effect. I derive conditions under which the latter effect dominates and the probability of a run is higher than with banks alone.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
2021
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 88, Issue 6, pp. 2654–2686
  • Biais, B., Heider, F. and Hoerova, M.
2017
Achieving Financial Stability Challenges to Prudential Regulation, Eds. Evanoff, D., Kaufman, G., Leonello, A. and Manganelli, S., World Scientific Books, No. 10529
Liquidity and capital: Substitutes or complements?
  • Hoerova, M.
2016
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 28, No C, pp. 32-47
  • Garcia, C., Heider, F., Hoerova, M. and Manganelli, S.
2016
Journal of Finance, Vol. 71, No 4, pp. 1669-1698
  • Biais, B., Heider, F. and Hoerova, M.
2016
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 67, pp. 103-118
  • Bekaert, G. and Hoerova, M.
2015
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 118, pp. 336-354
  • Heider, F., Hoerova, M. and Holthausen, C.
2015
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 54, pp. 266-280
  • Bussière, M., Hoerova, M. and Klaus, B.
2014
Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 183, pp. 181-192
  • Bekaert, G. and Hoerova, M.
2013
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 60, No 7, pp. 771-788
  • Bekaert, G., Hoerova, M. and Lo Duca, M.
2013
Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 17
Incentive-compatible centralized clearing
  • Biais, B., Heider, F. and Hoerova, M.
2012
IMF Economic Review, Vol. 60, pp. 193-222
  • Biais, B., Heider, F. and Hoerova, M.
2012
Economics Letters, Vol. 116, pp. 617-621
  • Hoerova, M., Monnet, C. and Temzelides, T.
2010
ECB Research Bulletin No. 10
Risk, uncertainty and monetary policy
  • Bekaert, G. and Hoerova, M.
2009
International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 5, pp. 1-39
  • Heider, F. and Hoerova, M.