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Melina Papoutsi
Research
- Division
Financial Research
- Current Position
-
Senior Economist
- Fields of interest
-
Financial Economics
- Education
- 2013-2018
PhD in Finance and Economics, Columbia University, New York, United States
- 2010-2011
MA in International and Development Economics, Yale University, New Haven, United States
- 2005-2009
BSc in Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece
- Professional experience
- 2018-2020
Economist - Monetary Policy Research Division, Directorate General Research, European Central Bank
- 2011-2013
Associate - Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, The World Bank, Washington D.C., United States
- Awards
- 2017
Outstanding PhD Student Paper, Fordham Gabelli School of Business
- 2017
Doctoral Fellowship, Arora - Naldi
- 2017
Best PhD Paper Award, Columbia Business School, Finance Division
- 2017
Best Finance PhD Paper Award, Washington University in St.Louis WFA-CFAR
- 2016
Doctoral Fellowship, Deming Center
- 2013
Doctoral Fellowship, Alexander S. Onassis Foundation
- 2010
Fellowship, Fulbright Foundation
- 16 June 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2826Details
- Abstract
- We document the structure of firm-bank relationships for the eleven largest euro area countries and present new stylized facts using data from the Eurosystem credit registry - AnaCredit. We look at the number of banking relationships, reliance on the main bank, credit instruments, loan maturity, and interest rates. Firms in Southern Europe borrow from more banks and obtain a lower share of credit from the main bank than those in Northern Europe. They also tend to borrow more on short-term, more expensive instruments and to obtain loans with shorter maturity. This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms in Southern Europe rely less on relationship banking and obtain credit less conducive to firm growth, in line with their smaller average size. Relationship lending does not translate into lower rates, possibly because banks appropriate part of the surplus generated by relationship lending through higher rates. Finally, assortative matching, according to which small banks specialize in supplying credit to small firms, is stronger in Northern European countries.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G3 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 15 June 2022
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 96Details
- Abstract
- While historically only very large firms issued in the European corporate bond market, recent years have seen the entry of many new players: small, private, and unrated issuers. Firm-level data show these new players face different game dynamics. They are disconnected from aggregate market movements and still depend heavily on banks. This means hey could potentially affect financial stability and be less responsive to policy interventions.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- 19 May 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2663Details
- Abstract
- Using newly available micro-data on public and private firms, this paper documents five facts about the rise of bond financing in the euro area through the lens of new and small issuers. (1) Recent new issuers are typically small, private, and unrated; (2) bond spreads of unrated issuers are around the investment-grade threshold; (3) holdings of traditional ‘buy-and-hold’ bond investors are small for unrated and smaller issuers, while financial intermediaries and households are large investors; (4) these investors were as flighty as mutual funds during the March 2020 turmoil; (5) the subsequent bond issuance wave was restricted to large rated firms, with other issuers returning to the loan market. These facts imply that these issuers are largely disconnected from the aggregate bond market and still significantly dependent on intermediaries.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- 18 May 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2553Details
- Abstract
- This paper presents evidence that personal relationships between corporate borrowers and bank loan officers improve the outcomes of loan renegotiation. Analysing a bank reorganization in Greece in the mid-2010s, I find that firms that experience an exogenous interruption in their loan officer relationship confront three consequences: one, the firms are less likely to renegotiate their loans; two, conditional on renegotiation, the firms are given tougher loan terms; and three, the firms are more likely to alter their capital structure. These results point to the importance of lending relationships in mitigating the cost of distress for borrowers in loan renegotiations.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
O16 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Development→Financial Markets, Saving and Capital Investment, Corporate Finance and Governance - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 25 February 2021
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 81Details
- Abstract
- Loan renegotiations are expected to surge following the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak and the subsequent crisis, as more loans default during recessions. At such times, managing lending relationships effectively becomes even more important for bank governance, risk, and credit supply. My study presents evidence that continuous lending relationships between bank loan officers and corporate borrowers improve the outcomes of loan renegotiations. The analysis draws on a novel dataset on corporate loans during a bank reorganisation in Greece in the mid-2010s. This dataset allows us to empirically identify the causal effect of interrupted relationships. My main findings are that firms that experience an exogenous interruption in their loan officer relationship are faced with three consequences. First, the firms are less likely to renegotiate a loan compared to firms with continuous relationships. Second, when loans are renegotiated, firms with interrupted loan officer relationships receive tougher loan terms. Third, these firms raise more equity, reduce their overall borrowing, and partially substitute borrowing from other banks. These results point to the importance of lending relationships in mitigating the cost of distress for borrowers renegotiating loans. It therefore suggests that bank managers, supervisors, and resolution authorities need to be mindful of the potential costs of changing loan officers.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
O16 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Development→Financial Markets, Saving and Capital Investment, Corporate Finance and Governance - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)