Nije dostupno na hrvatskom jeziku.
Kjell G. Nyborg
- 1 September 2011
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1376Details
- Abstract
- We study the prices that individual banks pay for liquidity (captured by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap) as a function of market conditions and bank characteristics. These prices depend in particular on the distribution of liquidity across banks, which is calculated over time using individual bank-level data on reserve requirements and actual holdings. Banks pay more for liquidity when positions are more imbalanced across banks, consistent with the existence of short squeezing. We also show that small banks pay more for liquidity and are more vulnerable to squeezes. Healthier banks pay less but, contrary to what one might expect, banks in formal liquidity networks do not. State guarantees reduce the price of liquidity but do not protect against squeezes.
- JEL Code
- G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
D44 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing→Auctions - Network
- ECB Lamfalussy Fellowship Programme
- 1 July 2002
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 157Details
- Abstract
- We study bidder bahavior and performance in 53 main refinancing operations (repo auctions) of the European Central Bank (ECB). The data set starts with the first auctions after the ECB changed from fixed rate tenders to variable rate tenders. We find that private information and the winnner's curse are not important in these auctions. The minimum bid rate and the level of secondary market rates play a crucial role in bidder behavior and auction performance. We also document that large bidders do better than small bidders, apparently because they use 'smarter' strategies which involve using more bids and having more kurtosis in their individual bid distribution. The penultimate auction in every reserve maintenance period has less underpricing that the other auctions within the maintenance period. Finally, from the two cases of underbidding covered by the sample period, it appears this was driven by particularly large cutrback by large, rather than small, bidders
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
D44 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing→Auctions
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General