Nije dostupno na hrvatskom jeziku.
Sascha Steffen
- 24 November 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2878Details
- Abstract
- We study the effect of changes in firms’ ESG ratings on the cost of debt of U.S. firms using a methodology change of an ESG rating provider. We find that loan spreads of downgraded ESG-rated firms in the secondary corporate loan market increase by about 10% compared to non-downgraded ESG-rated firms after the methodology change. The effect of ESG rating downgrades is not driven by the increase in the fundamental default risk of firms but rather by the premium charged by investors above the spread for default risk. The effect is stronger for firms that are more financially constrained, firms that are more exposed to ESG and, particularly, climate risk concerns as well as firms that are more held by climate-concerned lenders. We show that also loan spreads of private (unrated) firms in industries affected by ESG rating downgrades increase after the methodology change.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G24 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Investment Banking, Venture Capital, Brokerage, Ratings and Ratings Agencies - Network
- ECB Lamfalussy Fellowship Programme
- 17 November 2011
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1395Details
- Abstract
- This paper analyzes the importance of retail consumers' banking relationships for loan defaults using a unique, comprehensive dataset of over one million loans by savings banks in Germany. We find that loans of retail customers, who have a relationship with their savings bank prior to applying for a loan, default significantly less than customers with no prior relationship. We find relationships matter in different forms, scope, and depth. Importantly, though, even the simplest forms of relationships such as transaction accounts are economically meaningful in reducing defaults, even after controlling for other borrower characteristics as well as internal and external credit scores. Our results suggest that relationships of all kinds have inherent private information and are valuable in screening, in monitoring, and in reducing consumers' incentives to default.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- ECB Lamfalussy Fellowship Programme