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Stefania Secola

4 May 2022
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2660
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Abstract
Political science research has established that trust in institutions, including central banks, is shaped by socio-economic and demographic factors, as well as by the assessment of institutional features and by slow-moving components such as culture. However, the role of cognitive processes has largely been neglected, especially in the analysis of central bank trust. In this paper we aim to address this gap focusing on the case of the European Central Bank (ECB). We introduce the concepts of “instinctive trust”, which captures an on-the-spot judgement on the institution’s trustworthiness, and of “reflective trust”, which refers to a more pondered opinion on the matter. Using a survey experiment, we find that deeper consideration about the ECB promotes less trust in the institution compared to an on-the-spot judgement. This result is mainly driven by women, and in particular by those who say they possess a low understanding of the central bank’s policies.
JEL Code
C83 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology, Computer Programs→Survey Methods, Sampling Methods
D83 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge, Communication, Belief
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
Z13 : Other Special Topics→Cultural Economics, Economic Sociology, Economic Anthropology→Economic Sociology, Economic Anthropology, Social and Economic Stratification
28 February 2005
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 443
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Abstract
We analyse the distribution of the TARGET cross-border interbank payment flows, from both a cross-section and time series point of view, using average daily data for the period 1999-2002. We find out that first, "location matters", in the sense that bilateral payment flows seem to reflect an organisation of interbank trading between countries whereby the size of the banking sectors, geographical proximity and cultural similarities play a significant role. This result is confirmed also by a model developed drawing on the gravity models literature. Second, we find that the payment traffic in TARGET is strongly affected by market technical deadlines. In addition, such traffic is positively related mainly to the liquidity conditions and to the turnover of the euro area money market, (particularly the unsecured overnight segment). Our model also provides a good explanation of the determinants of the interbank payments settled in the EURO 1 system.
JEL Code
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages