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Dominika Kryczka
- 27 June 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2671Details
- Abstract
- We build a model to simulate how the euro area market-based financial system may function under stress. The core of the model is a set of representative agents reflecting key economic sectors, which interact in asset, funding, and derivatives markets and face solvency and liquidity constraints on their behaviour. We illustrate the model's behaviour in a two-layer approach. In Layer 1 the deterioration in the outlook for the corporate sector triggers portfolio reallocation by the model's agents. Layer 2 adds a rating downgrade shock where a fraction of investment grade corporate bonds is downgraded to high yield, which creates further rebalancing pressure and price movements. The model predicts (i) asset flows (buying and selling of marketable securities) across agents and (ii) balance sheet losses. It also provides quantitative evidence on equilibrium effects of the macroprudential regulation of nonbanks, which we illustrate by varying investment fund cash buffers.
- JEL Code
- G17 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Financial Forecasting and Simulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 7 May 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2545Details
- Abstract
- We build a three-period model to investigate market failures in the market-based financial system. Institutional investors (IIs), such as insurance companies and pension funds, have liabilities offering guaranteed returns and operate under a risk-sensitive solvency constraint. They seek to allocate funds to asset managers (AMs) that provide diversification when investing in risky assets. At the interim date, AMs that run investment funds face investor redemptions and liquidate risky assets and/or deplete cash holdings, if available. Dealer banks can purchase risky assets, thus providing market liquidity. The latter ultimately determines equilibrium allocations. In the competitive equilibrium, AMs suffer from a pecuniary externality and hold inefficiently low amounts of cash. Asset fire sales increase the overall cost of meeting redemptions and depress risk-adjusted returns delivered by AMs to IIs, forcing the latter to de-risk. We show that a macroprudential approach to (i) the liquidity regulation of AMs and (ii) the solvency regulation of IIs can improve upon the competitive equilibrium allocations.
- JEL Code
- D62 : Microeconomics→Welfare Economics→Externalities
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation
- 12 April 2021
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 12Details
- Abstract
- Large differences between the liquidity of investment funds’ assets and liabilities (i.e. liquidity mismatches) can create vulnerabilities in the financial system and expose funds to a risk of large outflows and sudden drops in market liquidity. From a macroprudential perspective, the current regulatory framework may not sufficiently address the risks stemming from liquidity mismatches in investment funds. By modelling the liquidity management of an open-ended fund, this article provides theoretical justification for pre-emptive policy measures such as cash buffers that enhance financial stability by helping to increase the resilience of investment funds.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation