Съдържанието не е налично на български език.
Sam Langfield
Economics
- Division
Supply Side, Labour and Surveillance
- Current Position
-
Lead Economist
- Fields of interest
-
Financial Economics
- Education
- 2006-09
MA and BA, University of Oxford
- Professional experience
- 2015-20
Principal, European Central Bank
- 2015-16
Visiting Professional, Princeton University
- 2012-15
Economist, European Central Bank
- 2009-12
Associate, UK Financial Services Authority
- 4 September 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2313Details
- Abstract
- Euro area governments have committed to break the doom loop between banks and sovereigns.But policymakers disagree on how to treat sovereign exposures in bank regulation. Our contributionis to model endogenous sovereign portfolio reallocation by banks in response toregulatory reform. Simulations highlight a tension between concentration and credit risk inportfolio reallocation. Resolving this tension requires regulatory reform to be complementedby an expansion in the portfolio opportunity set to include an area-wide low-risk asset. Byreinvesting into such an asset, banks would reduce both their concentration and credit riskexposure.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 24 September 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2176Details
- Abstract
- We study the allocation of interest rate risk within the European banking sector using novel data. Banks’ exposure to interest rate risk is small on aggregate, but heterogeneous in the cross-section. In contrast to conventional wisdom, net worth is increasing in interest rates for approximately half of the institutions in our sample. Cross-sectional variation in banks’ exposures is driven by cross-country differences in loan-rate fixation conventions for mortgages. Banks use derivatives to partially hedge on-balance sheet exposures. Residual exposures imply that changes in interest rates have redistributive effects within the banking sector.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- 24 May 2018
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2018Details
- Abstract
- This special feature analyses the distribution of interest rate risk in the euro area economy using balance sheet data and information on derivatives positions from significant credit institutions. On aggregate, banks’ interest rate risk exposure is small relative to their loss absorption capacity, but exposure varies across institutions. This variation is driven by loan rate fixation practices at country level. Banks use derivatives for hedging, but retain residual interest rate risk exposures. In fixed-rate countries the main vulnerability to rising interest rates lies with the banks that have the greatest interest rate risk, while households would be directly affected in countries with predominantly variable-rate loans. In the latter case, increased loan servicing costs due to rising interest rates could affect banks through lower asset quality.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 28 May 2015
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1797Details
- Abstract
- Europe
- JEL Code
- G1 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets
G2 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services
- 18 October 2012
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1484Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines the quality of credit ratings assigned to banks in Europe and the United States by the three largest rating agencies over the past two decades. We interpret credit ratings as relative assessments of creditworthiness, and define a new ordinal metric of rating error based on banks' expected default frequencies. Our results suggest that rating agencies assign more positive ratings to large banks and to those institutions more likely to provide the rating agency with additional securities rating business (as indicated by private structured credit origination activity). These competitive distortions are economically significant and contribute to perpetuate the existence of
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 28 September 2012
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 136Details
- Abstract
- This Occasional Paper reviews financial stability challenges in countries preparing for EU membership with a candidate country status, i.e. Croatia (planned to accede to the EU on 1 July 2013), Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey. It follows a macro-prudential approach, emphasising systemic risks of financial systems as a whole. After recalling that some EU candidate countries went through a pronounced boom-and-bust credit cycle in recent years, the paper identifies current challenges for the bank-based financial sectors as mainly stemming from: (i) high or rising domestic credit risk; (ii) unhedged borrowing in foreign currencies; and (iii) strains related to the euro area debt crisis, which is impacting the EU candidate countries via a number of channels. The main channels of transmission of the euro area debt crisis to the EU candidate countries operate via: (i) trade and foreign direct investment; (ii) an increased market focus on sovereign risk; and (iii) "deleveraging", e.g. via a decline of external funding to local subsidiaries of EU parent banks. A macro-stress-test exercise performed by the national authorities of the EU candidate countries in February 2012 suggests that large capital buffers can absorb a shock to credit quality stemming from a drop in economic activity in the EU and renewed strains from the euro area debt crisis. With respect to supervisory practices, the paper finds that the EU candidate countries have made good progress, but some gaps with respect to international and EU standards remain.
- JEL Code
- F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 2020
- Management Science
- 2020
- International Journal of Central Banking
- 2019
- Review of Financial Studies
- 2019
- Quantitative Finance
- 2018
- VoxEU
- 2018
- ESRB Occasional Paper 15
- 2017
- Economic Policy
- 2016
- Economic Policy
- 2016
- Computational Economics
- 2016
- Palgrave Handbook of European Banking
- 2016
- ESRB Occasional Paper 11
- 2016
- ESRB Advisory Scientific Committee Report 6
- 2016
- ESRB Occasional Paper 9
- 2016
- Bank Underground
- 2014
- Journal of Banking & Finance
- 2014
- ESRB Advisory Scientific Committee Report 4
- 2014
- ESRB Advisory Scientific Committee Report 5
- 2013
- Economic Policy
- 2013
- ESRB Occasional Paper 3