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Alessandro Giovannini
International & European Relations
- Division
EU Institutions & Fora
- Current Position
-
Team Lead - Economist
- Fields of interest
-
Public Economics
- Other current responsibilities
- 2020-2023
Hochschule der Deutschen Bundesbank - Guest Lecturer
- Education
- 2013-2015
M2 Economics: PhD-track, Sciences Po – Economics Department
- 2012-2013
MSc International Political Economy, London School of Economics and Political Sciences
- 2011-2012
Master International Economic Policy, Sciences Po – Paris School of International Affairs
- 2007-2010
BSc European Economics, Faculty of Economics, Università di Roma Tor Vergata
- 29 March 2023
- THE ECB BLOGDetails
- JEL Code
- H12 : Public Economics→Structure and Scope of Government→Crisis Management
- 10 August 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2705Details
- Abstract
- Parliamentary hearings are a fundamental tool to hold independent central banks accountable. However, it is not clear what type of information central banks provide when they communicate with parliaments compared to other existing information channels. In this article, we address this question by comparing the communication of the European Central Bank (ECB) in parliamentary hearings to its communication in the regular press conferences that follow monetary policy decisions. Using text analysis on the ECB President’s introductory statements in parliamentary hearings and press conferences from 1998 to 2021, we show that the ECB uses parliamentary hearings to discuss topics that are less covered in press conferences. We also find that the ECB’s policy stance in the hearings tends to reflect the stance in press conferences, and that the degree of language complexity is similar in the two fora. These findings support the view that the ECB mainly uses parliamentary hearings to further explain policy decisions first presented at press conferences but also to put them in a broader context.
- JEL Code
- E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 13 June 2022
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 295Details
- Abstract
- Well-functioning risk-sharing arrangements are essential for the shock absorbing capacity and resilience of an economy, even more so for countries in a monetary union where the single monetary policy is unable to address asymmetric shocks. The common shocks that euro area member states have been facing over the past years are just that: common. Yet their impacts are far from equal across countries, implying that risk sharing remains an important issue. This paper discusses the different forms and channels of risk sharing and reviews the main arguments in favour and against the development of different forms of public and private risk sharing in the euro area, focusing in particular on whether they act as complements or substitutes. It proposes a stylised theoretical model of a monetary union to test the complementarity or substitutability between public and private risk sharing. While the model calibration finds that substitutability prevails, the model also contains an interesting complementarity whereby a central fiscal capacity makes private risk sharing more efficient, especially in crisis times. Our findings are relevant for the ongoing policy discussion on EMU deepening as the provision of public risk sharing as well as the overall degree of risk sharing are still comparatively low in the euro area.
- JEL Code
- C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
- 27 April 2022
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - ARTICLEEconomic Bulletin Issue 3, 2022Details
- Abstract
- This article explores the relationship between economic inequalities and public trust in the ECB and other European institutions. Drawing on data from the ECB’s new Consumer Expectations Survey and the Standard Eurobarometer, it analyses the relationship between different forms of economic inequality, perceptions of inequality and public trust in the ECB and other EU institutions in the euro area over the period 1999-2020 and in the context of the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis.
- JEL Code
- D31 : Microeconomics→Distribution→Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
H11 : Public Economics→Structure and Scope of Government→Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
F15 : International Economics→Trade→Economic Integration
G53 : Financial Economics
- 14 March 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2655Details
- Abstract
- We investigate whether ideology drives the sentiments of parliamentarians when they speak to the central bank they hold accountable. To this end, we collect textual data on the quarterly hearings of the ECB President before the European Parliament from 1999 to 2019. We apply sentiment analysis to more than 1,900 speeches of individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from 128 parties. We find robust evidence that MEPs’ sentiments toward the ECB are correlated with the ideological stance predominantly on a pro-/anti-European dimension rather than on a left-right dimension.
- JEL Code
- E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 21 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 274Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines the importance of central bank communication in ensuring the effectiveness of monetary policy and in underpinning the credibility, accountability and legitimacy of independent central banks. It documents how communication has become a monetary policy tool in itself; one example of this being forward guidance, given its impact on inflation expectations, economic behaviour and inflation. The paper explains why and how consistent, clear and effective communication to expert and non-expert audiences is essential in an environment of an ever-increasing need by central banks to reach these audiences. Central banks must also meet the demand for more understandable information about policies and tools, while at the same time overcoming the challenge posed by the wider public’s rational inattention. Since the European Central Bank was established, the communications landscape has changed dramatically and continues to evolve. This paper outlines how better communication, including greater engagement with the wider public, could help boost people’s understanding of and trust in the Eurosystem.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 21 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 271Details
- Abstract
- This paper analyses the implications of climate change for the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area. It first investigates macroeconomic and financial risks stemming from climate change and from policies aimed at climate mitigation and adaptation, as well as the regulatory and fiscal effects of reducing carbon emissions. In this context, it assesses the need to adapt macroeconomic models and the Eurosystem/ECB staff economic projections underlying the monetary policy decisions. It further considers the implications of climate change for the conduct of monetary policy, in particular the implications for the transmission of monetary policy, the natural rate of interest and the correct identification of shocks. Model simulations using the ECB’s New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) illustrate how the interactions of climate change, financial and fiscal fragilities could significantly restrict the ability of monetary policy to respond to standard business cycle fluctuations. The paper concludes with an analysis of a set of potential monetary policy measures to address climate risks, insofar as they are in line with the ECB’s mandate.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming
- 23 September 2020
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOXEconomic Bulletin Issue 6, 2020Details
- Abstract
- The EU’s recovery package represents an important milestone in European economic policy integration. The European financial support to be provided is intended to have a meaningful volume in macroeconomic terms, totalling almost 5% of euro area GDP. Moreover, the allocation key ensures stronger macroeconomic support for more vulnerable countries. This coordinated European policy response to COVID-19 is essential to avoid an uneven recovery and economic fragmentation while promoting economic resilience in Member States. Finally, the way that the EU has responded to the crisis also has implications for the implementation and future design of the European governance framework.
- JEL Code
- F45 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
H12 : Public Economics→Structure and Scope of Government→Crisis Management
- 8 July 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2442Details
- Abstract
- As the role of central banks expanded, demand for public scrutiny of their actions increased. This paper investigates whether parliamentary hearings, the main tool to hold central banks accountable, are fit for this purpose. Using text analysis, it detects the topics and sentiments in parliamentary hearings of the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve from 1999 to 2019. It shows that, while central bank objectives play the most relevant role in determining the topic, unemployment is negatively associated with the focus of hearings on price stability. Sentiments are more negative when uncertainty is higher and when inflation is more distant from the central bank’s inflation aim. These findings suggest that parliamentarians use hearings to scrutinise the performance of central banks in line with their objectives and economic developments, but also that uncertainty is associated with a higher perceived risk of under-performance of central banks.
- JEL Code
- E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 9 August 2018
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - ARTICLEEconomic Bulletin Issue 5, 2018Details
- Abstract
- This article examines the evolution of the ECB’s accountability practices during the financial crisis. After describing the challenges stemming from the crisis and changes resulting from the conferral of new supervisory tasks on the ECB, it provides evidence on how the strengthening of the ECB’s accountability has taken shape in the context of its relationship with the European Parliament in line with the latter’s key role as provided for in the Treaties. The ECB and the European Parliament, building on the accountability framework enshrined in primary law, have increased the frequency of their interactions, made innovations regarding the format and sharpened the focus of their exchanges, allowing increased scrutiny of the ECB’s policies. This has provided the ECB with more opportunities to explain its decisions and demonstrate that it is acting in accordance with its democratic mandate, which is a fundamental pillar of its legitimacy.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 2022
- European Journal of Political Economy
- 2016
- International Economics and Economic Policy